Quite apart from the mark it will leave on the collective memory, the fund scandal also holds considerable significance in terms of current political balances. This is because we are talking about an organised structure that has grown within the establishment. The judiciary was also forced to announce that an organised criminal network, operating in a hierarchical and systematic manner, had been identified during the investigation. To date, more than 120 people have been arrested as part of the investigation.

Among them are numerous AKP figures, ranging from Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya – a former minister, MP and, at the time it was revealed she had embezzled funds, Deputy Chair of the AKP – to Ertan Aydın, another former MP and one of the architects of the ‘Turkey of the Century’ slogan. The Deputy Chair of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BDDK), the Head of the BDDK’s 3rd Enforcement Directorate, the Head of the BDDK’s 4th Director, the former General Manager of Borsa Istanbul, the former Deputy Chairman of the Capital Markets Board (SPK), the former Head of the SPK’s Market Supervision and Inspection Directorate, the former Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (TCMB), the former General Manager of Türkiye Sigorta and Türkiye Hayat Emeklilik, the former Deputy General Manager of Türkiye Sigorta, the former Chief Adviser to the Prime Minister, the former Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and the former Chairman of the State Audit Board are also included on the list.

It is claimed that this structure, whose personnel span from politics to the bureaucracy, generated a total profit of 187 billion 653 million TL through its activities, involving 141 individuals and 73 legal entities. The true scale of the heist remains unclear. Those involved are just as much in the dark… Amidst this uproar, the Chairman of the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency – who also served as a former AKP MP for Bayburt and former Governor of the Central Bank – Şahap Kavcıoğlu, whose three senior executives are currently in custody as part of the investigation, ‘resigned’ yesterday. Everyone knows that he did not resign of his own accord; he was forced out. It is not difficult to predict that others will follow.

The AKP government is facing unprecedented pressure and internal tension. Ways to overcome this predicament are being sought. The scene that unfolded when Fatma Betül Sayan Kaya went to give her statement alongside her husband, İlyas Kaya, on 5 November could well be described as ‘crisis communication’. The issue was not merely Kaya’s arrest; it was the fact that she was practically paraded to her arrest. An environment was created in which everything—from the moment she entered the courthouse to the moment she stepped into the prosecutor’s office—was recorded in real time. Kaya tried to conceal her facial expressions with large sunglasses, but it is fair to say that the photographs of her that reached the public have become a poster child for the fund fraud scandal.It soon became clear that, in the wake of the fund scandal, the truth could no longer be concealed.

The public outcry was not confined to the opposition; it also sparked immense anger amongst the AKP’s own grassroots. The anger was so intense that it began to strain and erode even the 25 per cent ‘hard core’ of supporters who, until now, had never turned their backs on the government, no matter what. It is highly likely that the AKP’s own opinion polls confirmed this. Whilst millions of people, including those who vote for the AKP, have been caught up in a livelihood crisis that has persisted for years, it became clear just how much wealth privileged individuals had amassed, the means by which this money was acquired, and just how detached the ruling elite had become from the people. At the same time, critical voices rose from within the party. After all, some were angry at being left out. As the scandal evolved into one of the dynamics of the power struggle within the party, a steady stream of names were singled out as targets.

The consensus was shaken by the reaction of the grassroots and the intensifying factional warfare, and the consolidation of power began to fray. The ‘we’re all in the same boat’ narrative that had held the government together suffered a severe blow. Consequently, once it was concluded that the existing framework would not suffice to overcome the crisis, the government moved to a phase of creating a new narrative by accelerating its efforts in a controlled manner.

The first step in the new narrative the government has constructed to overcome the fund scandal is to create the perception that ‘we are holding people to account’. The best way to create a perception is to produce images, and it is well known just how successful the government has been in this regard—whether the footage is ‘doctored’ or not. The footage of Fatma B.S. Kaya at the courthouse fits perfectly into this narrative. On the one hand, it instils the perception that everyone is being held to account and that the investigation is widening; on the other, it reinforces the impression that the regime has taken control.

The message being conveyed covertly to the public, the media and the political sphere is: “Go ahead and kick up a fuss over this; vent your resentment and anger.” Through this tactic, the government is distancing itself from the scandal by reducing it to the actions of a handful of greedy individuals, colluding or negligent bureaucrats. An image is being created of Erdoğan sweeping away the filth and purifying the state and politics. The crisis of trust between the party and its grassroots is also being addressed through this ‘moral barrier’. Just like a child who has been up to mischief and is left bruised and battered, AKP members rushed to Erdoğan immediately after the scandal broke.

This was both a reflex to seek refuge and a protective instinct. Statements such as “The Leader is very sad, very angry” were made to keep Erdoğan entirely removed from the incident whilst simultaneously using this issue as a stepping stone. For this disaster could only be overcome through a political manoeuvre, and within the AKP, no one but Erdoğan could carry this out. At this stage, whilst the upheaval caused by the fund scandal is being brought under control, the aim is to remove from debate the nature of the one-man regime – a system that has caused problems and will continue to do so.The first act of the fund scandal has drawn to a close.

The shock phase is behind us. The regime is now devising the plot for the second act. It is clear that the scandal in itself has triggered a severe crisis of confidence between the AKP and its grassroots support, yet a fire-fighting plan is in place precisely to overcome this. For this reason, the opposition must not view the fund embezzlement as a concluded matter or a cold, distant event now embedded in the collective memory. On the contrary, it must focus on a critique of the system that will undermine the ruling party’s ‘we are holding them to account’ rhetoric and ensure the current crisis of confidence persists. This system is both so rotten and unregulated that it paved the way for the scandal, and so reckless and unjust that it creates massive class divides between the people and the new ruling elites.

The regime’s Achilles’ heel is the social, economic and even spiritual chasm between the inner circle of officials surrounding the ruling party and the outer circle of its voters. The fund scandal has shown broad sections of the public just how vast this chasm is. An opposition capable of addressing this contradiction within the system could leave the AKP buried under the rubble of the fund scandal. Failure to do so will give the government a chance to regroup. It must not be forgotten that the regime possesses more than enough capacity and resources to capitalise on this opportunity.

Note: This article is translated from the original article titled Fonda birinci perde kapandı, published in BirGün newspaper on November 12, 2026.